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Abstract: In some severely uncertain situations, exemplified by climate change and novel 
pandemics, policymakers lack a reasoned basis for assigning probabilities to the possible 
outcomes of the policies they must choose between. I outline and defend an uncertainty 
averse, egalitarian approach to policy evaluation in these contexts. The upshot is a theory of 





When policymakers evaluate a policy, they are typically unsure what would result from 
choosing it. In welfare economics, such lack of knowledge is commonly dealt with by: (i) 
assigning precise probabilities to the possible outcomes of every policy under evaluation; (ii) 
assigning a value to each of these possible outcomes, for example by using a social welfare 
function which evaluates the distribution of well-being in each possible outcome; and finally 
(iii) recommending the policy with the highest expected value (the probability-weighted sum 
of the values of its possible outcomes) (Fleurbaey 2010; Adler 2019). Here, I will follow 
common practice decision theory and call situations in which a decisionmaker is in a position 




Sometimes, however, those who decide on a policy are not able to compute these expected 
values for a policy because they are unable to non-arbitrarily assign precise probabilities to 
every one of its possible outcomes. Here, I shall follow Knight (1921) and Keynes (1937) and 
refer to such situations as calculations as “uncertain.” (Following Ellsberg [1961], such 
situations are also commonly referred to as “ambiguous”.) Throughout, I use both “risk” and 
“uncertainty” in their subjective senses—as pertaining to the beliefs about the chances of 
possible outcomes of their decisions that a rational decision-maker can form on the basis of 
their priors and the evidence available to them.  
 
In welfare economics and political philosophy, there has been far more discussion of how to 
do expected value evaluation of policies than of how to make public decisions under 
uncertainty. In this chapter, I take a step towards remedying this comparative neglect. This 
project is worth pursuing because severely uncertain situations are common and important. 
One example is climate change (Heal and Millner 2018). In judging climate policies, policy-
makers face both climate-scientific uncertainty—about how the climate system works and 
would react to various emissions scenarios—and socio-economic uncertainty—about how 
individuals and societies will respond to changes in climate. Climate-scientific uncertainty 
arises because our main source of predictions about what might happen in various emissions 
scenarios are climate models. These are sensitive to changes in specified initial conditions 
which are only imperfectly known. They are also highly sensitive to the choice of functional 
forms by which key relationships are represented, and of key parameter values, both of which 
are also imperfectly known (Frigg et al. 2014). There is also scientific disagreement about 
some key causal mechanisms, how important they are, and how they interact with widely 
accepted mechanisms. Because of the diversity of these sources of uncertainty, some of 
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which cannot be captured by probability distributions over different potential initial values, 
functional forms, parameter values, and causal mechanisms, and because these different 
sources interact in the context of extremely sensitive models, it is commonly thought that it is 
not possible to non-arbitrarily capture current climate scientific knowledge by assigning a 
precise probability to key propositions, such as that in a “medium emissions scenario,” the 
Earth will warm by more than 2.0 degrees centigrade (Dietz 2014; Heal and Millner 2018). 
For this reason, the most authoritative report available, by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) assigns only ranges of probabilities to such propositions. For 
example, it reports that in one medium emissions scenario, “warming is likely to exceed 2.0 
degrees centigrade,” where “likely” means: “has a probability of between 66% and 100%” 
(IPCC 2014, p. 10).  
 
Social-scientific uncertainty about the impact on societies and people’s lives of various 
degrees of warming is arguably greater still (Heal and Millner 2018). For there is very little 
evidence about how changes in climate might affect such things as political stability, 
migration flows, or economic growth. Consequently, experts regard socio-economic impact 
assessments as highly speculative (Dietz 2014; Heal and Millner 2018). It follows that it 
would represent a leap beyond the information available to assign precise probabilities to 
outcomes of interest, such as “there is 3.0 degrees warming, a permanent loss of economic 
output of 5% of GDP, and there are large forced migration flows.”  
 
A second example of decision making under severe uncertainty is presented by novel 
pandemics. Again, the sources of uncertainty are multifarious. In the early months of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, for example, there was lack of information and there were grave 
differences of expert opinion about such key variables as the transmissibility of the virus that 
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causes COVID-19, its infection fatality rate, and the potential effectiveness of novel 
treatments and vaccines. There was also a notable lack of information and consensus about 
how various social and movement measures (e.g., mask wearing and “lockdowns”) might be 
expected to impact the virus’ spread and, more broadly, health and other components of well-
being. A significant source of information for policy decisions in the early months were non-
peer-reviewed models of disease spread. These models are non-linear, and their outcomes are 
highly dependent on assumed initial conditions and parameter values. Because of this 
sensitivity, small differences in these assumptions readily generated outcomes of interest 
(e.g., “deaths from disease with a given policy”) that differed by several orders of magnitude 
(Avery et al. 2020, pp. 10-11, and p. 20). Moreover, these assumptions were highly uncertain: 
initial conditions were unknown, functional forms disputed, and parameter values were often 
ad hoc. These diverse sources of uncertainty meant that there was no clear basis to assign 
precise probabilities to even one aspect of interest in evaluating policies, namely their impact 
on the spread of disease and associated deaths. Indeed, among five models of possible deaths 
in the UK and USA that achieved prominence in policy discussions early in the pandemic, 
only one provided probabilities for its estimates, and those were dubious (Avery et al. 2020, 
p. 26). The quality of information on possible wider health, social and economic impacts of 
social and movement measures such as lockdowns was, at the time, equally poor, in part 
because of the lack of precedent for such measures in contemporary economies. Assigning 
precise probabilities to the possible outcomes of key policies would therefore have 
represented a leap beyond the available evidence.  
 
In this chapter, I outline an approach to policy evaluation for such uncertain situations. There 
is political-philosophical work to be done in using the tools of decision theory for this 
purpose. For the bulk of the literature has been devoted to the question how, under 
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uncertainty, people actually do and rationally may make decisions on their own behalf. There 
is less work on how to make public decisions in the absence of precise probabilities.1  
 
I proceed as follows. In Section 1, I outline a pluralist egalitarian theory of distributive justice 
for situations of risk that I will take as my point of departure. In Section 2, I make the case for 
the permissibility of using a cautious decision criterion under uncertainty. In Section 3, I 
explore some implications of incorporating this form of caution into the outlined egalitarian 
view. I show that caution strengthens one element of egalitarian solidarity by reinforcing its 
concern for those who may end up worse off than others. But I also show that it may 
counteract another element of such solidarity, namely the tendency to ensure that everyone 
“sinks or swims” jointly. In Section 4, I conclude. 
 
1. Egalitarianism under Risk 
 
On the pluralist egalitarian view that I shall draw on here, people’s interests should be 
considered from two perspectives. The first is in terms of the value of their prospects. A 
person’s prospects are important because they capture the extent to which a policymaker’s 
actions promote this person’s interests as they are rationally viewed with the information at 
hand when deciding on a policy. The second is in terms of each person’s final well-being. 
This is relevant because this represents the interests that a policymaker should aim to see 
advanced equally, if they were fully informed about how each person would end up faring.  
 
On the proposed egalitarian view, it is unfair when people’s interests in having good 
prospects and in faring well are advanced unequally. Besides limiting these two forms of 
inequality, the view in question is also concerned with promoting people’s interests, both in 
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prospect and in terms of their final well-being. In sum, on this view, a policy-maker should 
adopt the following aims: (i) reducing inequalities in the value of people’s prospects; (ii) 
reducing inequality in final well-being; (iii) improving people’s prospects; and (iv) improving 
final well-being.2  
 
Throughout, I assume an interpersonally comparable, cardinal measure of well-being derived 
from idealized preferences under risk. On this measure, a first policy yields higher expected 
well-being for a person than a second policy just in case it would be preferred for this 
person’s sake after rational deliberation with relevant knowledge while taking into account 
only this person’s self-interest. A first policy yields the same expected well-being as a second 
policy for a person if and only if such a deliberator would be indifferent between the two 
policies on this person’s behalf. (For a defense of this measure, which is common in parts of 
welfare economics see Adler 2019, Appendix D.) I shall also assume that even though 
individuals’ actual preferences risk may diverge from this idealization because of reasoning 
errors and biases, individuals accept the idea that their good should be measured by the 
preferences they would have after deliberation that corrected these errors and biases, so that 
in measuring their well-being by these idealized preferences, we are aligning ourselves with 
their judgments (Arneson 1990). Finally, I assume that in situations of risk it is permissible 
for a policymaker to maximize expected moral value. In sum, I adopt an orthodox approach 
under risk. This allows me to focus on the departure I make from the orthodoxy in cases of 
severe uncertainty. 
 
To illustrate the outlined egalitarian view under risk, imagine that you are a resource 
allocation manager in a government-run health system. Two twenty year-old citizens, Ayan 
and Bashir, face a debilitating illness which, if untreated, will leave them unable to walk and 
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so limited in dexterity that they will require the help of another person for most tasks. 
Consequently, they will have a lifetime well-being of 30 (a merely tolerable quality of life). If 
fully cured, each would have a lifetime well-being of 80 (a very good quality of life). You do 
not have enough resources to fully cure them both for sure. Instead, you can allocate 
resources towards one of the alternatives outlined in the top section of Table 1. To link up 
with Ellsberg’s (1961) paradigmatic contrasting presentations of risky and uncertain 
alternatives, risk will be represented by a random draw from an urn which is known to 
contain only 50 red balls and 50 black balls. The numbers in brackets in the table are the 





Table 1. Final Well-being for All Alternatives  
Risky Alternatives Draw from a risky urn 
Red (0.5) Black (0.5) 




































Uncertain Alternatives Draw from an uncertain urn 
Red (from 0.2 to 0.8) Black (from 0.2 to 0.8) 



















In what follows, for simplicity, I shall evaluate such alternatives while setting aside all 
considerations besides the well-being of the individuals in question. In a choice between 
Inequality under Certainty, which cures Ayan and leaves Bashir severely debilitated, and 
Equal Risk, Unequal Final Well-being, which will cure precisely one of them but gives each 
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an equal chance at being cured, the outlined egalitarian view chooses the latter. For there is, it 
holds, less unfairness when each is given an equal chance at a cure than when one is given a 
cure outright and the other has no chance at receiving it. Equality under Certainty, is, 
naturally, better still, since, by giving both a partially effective treatment that leaves them 
with a moderately good life with a level of well-being precisely midway between the grave 
disability and a full cure, it eliminates inequality in final well-being at no cost in total 
expected well-being. Finally, the view regards Equality under Certainty as just as good as 
Equality under Risk, because the latter also involves no inequality and offers each person the 
same expected well-being as the former.  
 
This series of judgments is the upshot of combining a concern for eliminating unfair 
disadvantage in the value of prospects and in how people end up with a decision theory that is 
risk-neutral in personal good and moral value. It also has a grounding in a central idea of 
much of the post-WWII egalitarian literature on distributive justice, namely that an 
individual’s life has a unity that a bare mass of people does not and that, consequently, moral 
precepts for pure intrapersonal trade-offs without inequality differ from precepts for trade-
offs between distinct individuals’ interests (Gauthier 1963, p. 121-7; Nagel 1970, p. 138; 
Rawls 1999, pp. 23-4). The integrality of a person’s life gives us reason to make pure 
intrapersonal trade-offs with the aim of maximizing this person’s expected well-being, as 
prudence dictates (given the assumed measure of well-being). The distinctions between 
persons, meanwhile, demands that when people’s interest conflict, we have greater concern 
for those who are less well off. This idea motivates choosing Equal Risk, Unequal Final 
Well-being over Inequality under Certainty. For this choice involves an opposition of 
interests in having valuable prospects between Ayan and Bashir, which—given the fact that 
total expected well-being is constant—it resolves by maximizing the prospects of the least 
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well-off. It also motivates choosing Equality under Certainty over Equal Risk, Unequal Final 
Well-being, since this choice involves a conflict of final-well-being interests, with it being in 
the final-well-being interest of whoever would end up worse off under Equal Risk, Unequal 
Final Well-being that Equality under Certainty had been chosen instead, while the opposite 
would be in the final-well-being interest of whoever would end up better off under Equal 
Risk, Unequal Final Well-being. Given that these alternatives yield the same total well-being, 
the separateness of persons requires that this conflict be resolved in favor of the least well-
off. Finally, respect for the unity of the individual supports regarding Equality under 
Certainty and Equality under Risk as equally choiceworthy, since the choice between them 
involves no conflicts of interest in terms of prospects or final well-being (and no inequality), 
so that we may choose any policy that maximizes each person’s prospects. 
 
2. Caution under Uncertainty 
 
Let us now consider cases of uncertainty. Suppose again that Ayan and Bashir will suffer the 
aforementioned grave disability unless they are treated. You must either allocate resources 
towards the treatment described by Equality under Risk from Table 1, which, due to its 
extensive track record, you rationally believe offers a 0.5 chance of fully curing both and a 
0.5 chance of being wholly ineffective for both, or instead provide a new treatment, Equality 
under Uncertainty, which will also either fully cure both or be wholly ineffective for both and 
for which the limited evidence available suggests that its chance of yielding a full cure ranges 
somewhere from 0.2 to 0.8. It is depicted in the lower part of Table 1. In line with Ellsberg’s 
(1961) presentation, uncertainty is here represented by a random draw from an urn known to 
contain precisely 100 balls, all of which are either red or black, with the only information 
available being that at least 20 and at most 80 of these balls are red (i.e., no information is 
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available about the process by which the urn has been filled). Which treatment(s) is it 
permissible for you to provide?  
 
In this choice, I submit that it is permissible for you to provide the treatment to which you 
can assign precise probabilities. Moreover, it would be permissible for you to have a strict 
preference for this treatment and to provide it even if it carried some small cost, in the sense 
of slightly worsening the final well-being outcomes for Ayan and Bashir. (To be precise, 
suppose that choosing Equality under Risk would result in cost c for each person in every 
event, so that if Red were drawn, Ayan and Bashir would each end up with a well-being of 80 
– c and if Black were drawn, they would each end up with 30 – c. My claim is that there is a c 
> 0 for which it would be permissible to choose Equality under Risk.)  
 
The argument for this judgment proceeds in three steps (Joyce 2005, pp. 168-171; Gilboa, 
Postlethwaite, and Schmeidler 2009). First, rationality does not require you to go beyond the 
evidence and assign, arbitrarily, precise probabilities to the outcomes of each alternative that 
you might choose. Instead, it permits you simply to represent your beliefs in terms of ranges 
of probabilities assigned to each possible outcome as, say, the IPCC does for the “medium 
emissions” policy mentioned in the Introduction, when they judge that there is between 66% 
and 100% chance that this policy would lead to warming of more than 2.0 degrees. In our 
novel treatment example, this means you need not move beyond the assumption that the 
chance of this treatment fully curing Ayan and Bashir ranges from 20% to 80%.  
 
Second, when you have only such imprecise probabilities, you cannot compute a single 
expected value for a prospect. But you can compute a range of such expected values. In the 
IPCC example, assuming that more warming is worse, the worst expected value of the 
12 
 
“medium emissions” policy will be one in which there is a 100% chance that it leads to more 
than 2.0 degrees warming and the best expected value of this policy is that there is only a 
66% chance that it leads to such warming. All the IPCC’s information allows you to say is 
that the expected value of this medium emissions prospect is in the range given by these 
values. In our novel treatment example, this means that for each person, Equality under 
Uncertainty has an expected value in the range of 40 (the possible outcomes weighted by the 
least favorable probability distribution consistent with your evidence, that is, 0.8 × 30 + 0.2 × 
80) to 70 (the possible outcomes weighted by the most favorable probability distribution 
consistent with your evidence, that is, 0.2 × 30 + 0.8 × 80).  
 
Third, in the face of this range of expected values, it is permissible to be cautious, in the 
sense that in making an overall assessment of the uncertain prospect’s value, you may 
permissibly give more decision weight to the less good expected values than the better 
expected values. To apply it to our examples: when assessing the prospect associated with a 
policy of “medium emissions,” you are permitted to give more decision weight to the 
possibility that this would certainly lead to more than 2.0 degrees warming than to the 
possibility that this would only have a 66% chance of leading to such warming. And in the 
novel treatment case, you can permissibly take the prospective value of the novel medicine 
for each of Ayan and Bashir to be less than the mid-point between 40 and 70. (So less than 
55, the expected value of the well-known medicine.)  
 
The basic ideas in this argument are simple and attractive: no requirement to go beyond the 
evidence and a permission to be cautious in the face of lack of evidence. The upshot is that 
what is known as uncertainty aversion (a strict preference for prospects with precise 
probabilities over otherwise analogous prospects without such probabilities) is permissible. 
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There is a further dimension to the issue which arises for policymakers, namely, the attitudes 
towards uncertainty of the people whose prospects and fates hang in the balance. In general, 
respect for citizens’ reasonable judgments of their own good makes it fitting for a 
policymaker to, as far as possible, track the rationally permissible attitudes of their citizens 
towards their own interests (Arneson 1990). Here, I include people’s rationally permissible 
attitudes towards uncertainty in these judgments that policymakers have reason to respect. I 
also assume what I take to be a common situation for policymakers, which is that they do not 
know the uncertainty attitudes of every member of their population but do know the general 
social-scientific findings about these attitudes. Empirical studies suggest that in self-
interested choices, both uncertainty aversion and uncertainty neutrality (which involves 
indifference between uncertain and analogous risky alternatives) are common, and 
uncertainty-loving behavior (which involves a strict preference for uncertain over comparable 
risky alternatives) is rare (Trautmann and van de Kuilen 2015, Table 1; Voorhoeve et al. 
2016; Chew et al. 2018). It is therefore reasonable to hold that assuming a modest degree of 
uncertainty aversion on behalf of citizens would be the upshot of a procedure that minimized 
a reasonable measure of “aggregate distance” between citizens’ diverse attitudes towards 
uncertainty. (For example, the mean attitude towards uncertainty suggested by the 
aforementioned studies would be one of modest uncertainty aversion.) If, for the reasons just 
outlined, uncertainty aversion is rationally permissible (possibly alongside uncertainty-
neutral and uncertainty-loving behavior), this would therefore make it reasonable for the 
decision-maker to employ a degree of uncertainty aversion as a good approximation of (or 
reasonable compromise between) the differing reasonable attitudes of the individuals on 




It is important to note that despite its appeal, the rationality of uncertainty aversion is 
disputed. The reason is that on the assumption that uncertainty aversion is in tension with a 
core axiom of decision theory, the Sure Thing Principle. This means that uncertainty aversion 
has some unappealing implications.3  
 
I cannot here review the extensive debate on the rational permissibility of uncertainty 
aversion. I will therefore briefly report my perspective on it, which is that the arguments 
show that not all independently attractive principles of rationality can be reconciled. In 
particular, there is at least an apparent tension between (i) the ideas that rationality does not 
require a decision-maker to posit precise probabilities for which they lack adequate ground 
and that a decision-maker is allowed a degree of caution in the face of such imprecision, and 
(ii) the idea that a decision-maker should respect other attractive principles of rational choice, 
such as the Sure Thing Principle. There are different reasonable ways of navigating this 
inconsistency, among which are uncertainty-averse decision principles (Gilboa et al. 2009; 
Siniscalchi 2009; Heal and Millner 2018).  
 
There are several leading uncertainty-averse decision criteria. For concreteness, I shall here 
use a well-known, simple criterion which is often traced back to Leonard Hurwicz’ work on 
decision-making under ignorance (Hurwicz 1951). My conclusions hold for other leading 
criteria, e.g. those advanced in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Klibanoff et al. (2005).  
 
On what is known as α-maxmin expected utility, the decision-maker values a prospect by 
taking α × the worst expected value that is consistent with their information and priors and 
adding (1 – α) × the best expected value that is so consistent, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is the decision 
weight given to the worst expected value (Binmore 2009; Wakker 2010, sec. 11.5.) A 
15 
 
cautious evaluator will give more decision weight to the worst expected value—i.e., will have 
α > 0.5—and this will lead them to be uncertainty averse. An uncertainty-neutral evaluator 
will give equal weight to both—i.e., will have α = 0.5. An uncertainty-loving evaluator will 
give greater weight to the best expected value, i.e., will have α < 0.5. I shall in the rest of this 
chapter explore what follows if we assume a fixed, moderate degree of uncertainty aversion 
for all objects of evaluation—that is, both for the evaluation of a prospect for a single 
individual and a social prospect. This implies an invariant α somewhat larger than 0.5. 
 
To illustrate, consider again the novel treatment represented by Equality under Uncertainty, 
and suppose for concreteness that α = 0.6. The α-maxmin expected utility criterion then 
evaluates Ayan’s uncertain prospect as follows: 0.6 × (0.8 × 30 + 0.2 × 80) (the worst 
expected value) + 0.4 × (0.2 × 30 + 0.8 × 80) (the best expected value) = 52. This is 3 units of 
well-being less than the corresponding risky treatment. In what follows, shall refer to this 
diminution of the value of an individual’s prospects due to uncertainty as the “individual-
level burden” of uncertainty. Naturally, the value of Bashir’s prospects under Equality under 
Uncertainty is similarly depressed. But besides these individual-level burdens, this case 
involves what I shall call “social-level uncertainty” about the distribution of final well-being. 
For the facts that either both will end up fully cured or both will end up with a severe 
disability and that there are no precise probabilities for these outcomes depresses the 




3. Cautious Egalitarianism 
 
I shall now review a few key implications of incorporating this form of uncertainty aversion 
in the form of pluralist egalitarianism outlined in Section 1. In each instance, I shall connect 
the findings from simple cases to general considerations of justice and policy-making. 
 
First, uncertainty-averse egalitarianism posits a novel object of egalitarian concern: the 
degree to which individual-level uncertainty depresses the value of individuals’ prospects 
(Rowe and Voorhoeve 2018, pp. 255-6). An illustrative case of unequal burdens of 
uncertainty arises in the comparison of the uncertainty faced by people who live in regions 
and work in professions that are unlikely to be gravely disrupted by temperature rises (e.g., 
office workers in temperate zones) and those whose location and jobs are such that their lives 
and livelihoods would be severely affected by changes in the climate (e.g., farmers in 
marginal lands in the Sahel) (Denning et al. 2015). Another illustration concerns the 
differential burden of uncertainty around the negative impact on well-being of lockdowns to 
deal with COVID-19 in many countries. When first implemented, the range of potential 
impacts on well-being (and therefore the depressing effect of uncertainty on individuals’ 
prospects at the moment of implementation) was arguably less for those in rich nations who 
could work remotely and who had access to government support if they should need it than it 
was for those in poorer nations who rely on the informal economy, whose work might be 
most disrupted by these measures, and who often have difficulty accessing social safety nets 
(Ray and Subramanian 2020). An uncertainty-averse, egalitarian view sees strong reasons to 
improve the prospects of those who face greater uncertainty, for example by insuring them 
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against the downside of their imprecisely estimated risks or by gaining information and 
thereby narrowing the imprecision in these estimates. 
 
Second, the proposed cautious, egalitarian approach will favor policies for which a better 
basis is available for assigning probabilities to outcomes. This was already clear in the 
comparison made (at the end of Section 2) of Equality under Risk with its uncertain 
counterpart, Equality under Uncertainty. The same is true in a choice between Equal Risk, 
Unequal Final Well-being and its uncertain counterpart, Equal Uncertainty, Unequal Final 
Well-being, which is depicted in the lower part of Table 1. After all, the individual-level 
uncertainty created by the latter policy depresses the value of both individuals’ prospects 
compared to its risky counterpart. One practical implication is that it is permissible for 
governments to go to greater expense to mitigate severely uncertain threats to life (e.g., posed 
by a novel pandemic) than to mitigate threats to which they can readily attach probabilities 
(e.g., posed by traffic accidents).4  
 
A third key implication is that when, under uncertainty, some will gain and others will lose, 
uncertainty aversion reinforces the egalitarian tendency to allocate resources to those 
whoever will end up less well off (Rowe and Voorhoeve 2018, pp. 257-9). To see why, 
suppose that a policy-maker must choose between Equal Uncertainty, Unequal Final Well-
being and Equality under Certainty in Table 1, but with the latter modified so that it comes at 
a cost c to each person’s final (and prospective) well-being, so that it would yield only 55 – c 
for each person for sure, with 0 ≤ c ≤ 25. On the proposed egalitarian view, in choosing 
between these options, we should consider both the value of individual prospects and the 
prospective value of the distribution of final well-being. Under Equal Uncertainty, Unequal 
Final Well-being, the value of individuals’ prospects is depressed by the limited information 
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available about their likelihood of ending up badly off. An uncertainty-averse policymaker 
should therefore be willing to incur at least some small cost to eliminate this uncertainty. 
Considering the distribution of final well-being, a downside of Equal Uncertainty, Unequal 
Final Well-being is inequality in how people will end up faring. Inequality aversion will 
therefore prompt a policymaker to incur a cost to eliminate this inequality.  
 
It follows that both uncertainty aversion and inequality aversion will direct us to incur a cost 
to remove inequality in this kind of case. What is more, together, they will direct us to incur a 
higher cost to achieve equality than either one of these considerations alone would 
countenance (Rowe and Voorhoeve 2018, pp. 258-9). To understand why, assume for a 
moment that our inequality-averse policymaker was uncertainty neutral (that is, their α = 0.5). 
They would then evaluate Equal Uncertainty, Unequal Final Well-being as equivalent to 
Equal Risk, Unequal Final Well-being. Suppose that in a choice between Equal Risk, 
Unequal Final Well-being and Equality under Certainty with a cost c to each person, the 
correct degree of inequality aversion will direct us to incur a cost of up to, but no greater 
than, c* units of prospective well-being for each person, so that both Equal Uncertainty, 
Unequal Final Well-being and Equal Risk, Unequal Final Well-being would be equivalent to 
giving each of Ayan and Bashir 55 – c* for sure. Next, assume that our policymaker becomes 
uncertainty averse (that is, their α > 0.5). They will then find Equal Uncertainty, Unequal 
Final Well-being strictly worse than Equal Risk, Unequal Final Well-being. By transitivity, 
they will then regard the uncertain alternative as strictly worse than giving each of Ayan and 
Bashir 55 – c*. In other words, they will find Equal Uncertainty, Unequal Final Well-being 
to be as good as Equality under Certainty only for a cost larger than c*. We can conclude that 
in cases in which individual-level uncertainty will lead to some faring better than others, 
uncertainty-averse egalitarianism justifies incurring a larger cost in order to achieve both 
19 
 
equality and certainty than an uncertainty-neutral egalitarian view would countenance. After 
all, under these circumstances, directing benefits from the lucky to the unlucky reduces the 
stakes for each and thereby reduces the burden of uncertainty; naturally, it also diminishes 
inequality. A policy issue to which this may be relevant is levying “windfall taxes” on firms 
and people who gain due to severely uncertain economic developments, with these taxes 
spent on improving the situation of the losers. (This is a policy that has been considered in the 
UK, for example, in response to the COVID-19 crisis, see Cowburn 2021.) Such policies that 
reduce the variability of incomes under uncertainty will be valuable both because they reduce 
the burden of uncertainty and because they reduce inequality. 
 
A fourth key conclusion starts from the observation that individual-level uncertainty need not 
imply social-level uncertainty about the distribution of final well-being. To see why, consider 
again Equal Uncertainty, Unequal Final Well-being in Table 1. The individual-level 
uncertainty depresses the value of everyone’s prospects. However, it has no social-level 
uncertainty about the value of the possible distributions of final well-being. For the 
anonymized distribution of final well-being is known: one person will be fully cured, another 
will remain severely disabled. 
 
This has an important implication for how the ranking of policies under risk compares to the 
ranking of their counterpart policies under uncertainty. Equality under Risk is, on the 
proposed egalitarian view, strictly preferred to Equal Risk, Unequal Final Well-being, 
because the former eliminates all inequality without any loss in terms of the value of 
individual prospects or in the value of the prospective distribution of final well-being. 
However, the ranking of these policies’ uncertain counterparts is less straightforward. In 
terms of the value of individual prospects, Equality under Uncertainty and Equal 
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Uncertainty, Unequal Final Well-being are identical. However, in terms of the prospective 
value of the possible distributions of final well-being, a concern for equality and a concern to 
reduce uncertainty may pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, it counts in favor of 
Equality under Uncertainty that it eliminates all inequality. On the other hand, because under 
this policy, everyone sinks or swims together, it generates problematic uncertainty at the 
collective level. In contrast, Equal Uncertainty, Unequal Final Well-being does not generate 
such collective-level uncertainty. This is one respect in which Equal Uncertainty, Unequal 
Final Well-being may be better.5 
 
The view I put forward here does not pronounce on which of these two policies is superior 
overall. The key conclusion is just that uncertainty aversion may oppose the solidaristic, 
egalitarian impulse to bind everyone’s fates together. In doing so, it changes egalitarianism in 
one important way (Rowe and Voorhoeve 2018, pp. 261-2). Under risk, the outlined 
egalitarian view has a tendency to allocate benefits away from the lucky and towards the 
unlucky if and only if the lucky are (or would be without an egalitarian allocation) better off 
than others and the unlucky are (or would be) less well off than others. By way of 
illustration, as we have seen, the proposed form of egalitarianism is indifferent between 
Equality under Risk and Equality under Certainty in Table 1. Moreover, if Equality under 
Certainty could be purchased only at a small cost c to each person’s well-being (so that it 
would yield only 55 – c for each person for sure, with c positive and small), the proposed 
egalitarian view would be unwilling to pay any cost in order to redistribute from the better off 
potential futures of Ayan and Bashir to their less well off potential futures. By contrast, under 
uncertainty, a cautious egalitarian will see reason to direct benefits from the lucky towards 
the unlucky even when these are merely two potential futures of the same person and there is 
no inequality. To see this, compare Equality under Uncertainty with Equality under 
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Certainty. Due to uncertainty aversion, the latter is clearly preferable. Moreover, if Equality 
under Certainty could be purchased only at a cost c to each person’s final (and prospective) 
well-being (so that it would yield only 55 – c for each person for sure), the proposed view 
would strictly prefer Equality under Certainty over Equality under Uncertainty for some 
small, positive c. Under uncertainty, cautious egalitarianism is therefore keen to direct 
benefits away from Ayan and Bashir’s better possible futures towards their worse possible 
futures, even when their rosier futures would not involve them being better off than others.  
 
As a practical matter, it follows from the proposed view that governments have special reason 
to make provision for collective setbacks to which they are not able to assign a precise 
probability. As a concrete illustration, if natural resource revenues are of this kind, then for 
governments that are highly dependent on revenues from these resources, this favors 
instruments such as hedges against price falls (used, for example, by Mexico to cover its oil 
revenues, see Reuters 2015) or creating fiscal space to support the economy in the face of a 




I have argued that in uncertain situations, it is permissible for a policymaker to consider a 
range of expected values for each policy, rather than a single expected value. I have also 
argued that, in response to this range, it is permissible for a policy-maker to assign greater 
decision weight to the lower expected values within this range. One reason I have offered for 
this approach is that a substantial share of the population whose fates are at stake in their 
decisions are likely to be uncertainty averse and very few are likely to be uncertainty loving, 
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so that a modest degree of uncertainty aversion in public decision-making is a reasonable 
compromise. 
 
I also explored some key implications of incorporating such uncertainty aversion into a 
pluralistic egalitarian theory of justice and for using such a theory for policy evaluation. I 
argued that uncertainty aversion reinforces egalitarian reasons to reduce unfair inequalities 
and to resolve interpersonal conflicts of interest in favor of the less well off. Moreover, it 
gives us new reasons to make intrapersonal trade-offs under uncertainty in a way that favors 
the person’s less fortunate potential futures. The upshot is a theory of justice which offers 
stronger reasons for safety net policies that guard against individual and collective 
misfortune. Such policies are commonly defended as valuable because they improve people’s 
prospects by reducing risks in relation to income and health and because they reduce 
inequalities (Barr 2012). But a consideration of severely uncertain situations reveals further 
functions of such a safety net. By aiding the unfortunate, it both reduces the depressing 
impact of uncertainty on the value of individuals’ prospects and reduces policymakers’ 
uncertainty about how social outcomes. This finding is relevant for our two opening 
examples. In the context of climate change, higher emissions pathways are associated with 
greater variability in the moral value of possible outcomes and therefore with a larger 
disvalue of uncertainty (Millner et al. 2013); they are also projected to generate greater 
inequality (Denning et al. 2015). A cautious, inequality-averse approach will therefore hold 
that we have strong reasons to lower emissions (and more reasons than a common, expected 
value maximizing utilitarian approach would register). In the context of the COVID-19 
pandemic, this approach reinforces reasons to develop treatments and vaccines (since these 
will tend to improve worse possible futures) and to introduce social and movement measures 
to contain the spread of disease so long as these are accompanied by income support to the 
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worst off (Adler et al. 2020; Ray and Subramanian 2020). In short, uncertainty adds to 
policymakers’ reasons to make provision for the least fortunate. 
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1 In moral and political philosophy, an exception to the neglect of severe uncertainty has been 
the discussion of how to make decisions behind John Rawls’s veil of ignorance, which 
creates a severely uncertain situation by denying people knowledge of the probability of 
ending up in any particular social position (Rawls 1999, p. 134). In welfare economics, 
contributions that take account of this aspect of severe uncertainty in policy evaluation focus 
on environmental policy and pandemics. See, e.g., Liu et al. (2005), Treich (2010), Heal and 
Millner (2018), Berger et al. (2020), and Inoue and Miyagishima (2021).  
2 This formulation leaves open here the precise way these different aims of reducing 
inequality and promoting well-being are defined. For concreteness, I shall assume that the 
degrees to which prospects and final well-being are promoted are given by their total value. 
See Fleurbaey (2010); Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey (2016) and Voorhoeve (2021, appendix) for 
a proposed more precise formulation of pluralist egalitarianism. The proposed form of 
egalitarianism builds on an extensive literature which emphasizes the importance of both 
people’s prospects and final well-being, including Ulph (1982), Cohen (1989), Broome 
(1990), and Temkin (1993).  
3 The Sure Thing Principle can be understood as follows (see Bradley 2017, sec. 4.4). 
Consider Table n1, in which f, g, f’ and g’ are alternative acts, E and not-E are events, and X, 




through a combination of choosing f and the occurrence of E or through choosing f’ and the 




f X Y 
g X* Y 
f’ X Y* 
g’ X* Y* 
The Sure-Thing Principle states that, in Table n1, f should be preferred to g if and only if f' is 
preferred to g'. The reasoning in support of this principle is as follows. f should be preferred 
to g just in case X should be preferred to X*. This is because f and g have the same outcome 
whenever E is not the case, and so should be evaluated solely in terms of their outcomes 
when E is the case. Consequently, any other alternatives such as f’ and g’, which have the 
same outcomes as f and g respectively whenever E is the case, and identical outcomes when it 
is not, should be ranked in the same order as f and g. For an explanation of why uncertainty 
aversion can lead one to violate this principle and for discussion of the problems to which this 
violation gives rise, see Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009). 
4 Such greater expense to prevent imprecise risks aligns with surveys on the value of 
reductions in fatality risks, in which individuals tend to place a premium on reductions in 
imprecisely over precisely specified chances of death (see Hammitt 2020, pp. 140-8). 
5 This is true, at least, for some policymakers with a modest degree of inequality aversion. An 
extremely inequality averse policymaker may well will hold that there is no respect in which 




policymaker who uses the maximin rule to evaluate distributions of final well-being. They 
will hold that Equality under Uncertainty has a better distribution of final well-being than 
Equal Uncertainty, Unequal Final Well-being in one state of the world and an equivalent 
distribution of final well-being in another, so that the former dominates the latter, despite 
uncertainty.  
